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Abstract
The role of types in categorical models of meaning is investigated. A
general scheme for how typed models of meaning may be used to compare
sentences, regardless of their grammatical structure is described, and a toy
example is used as an illustration. Taking as a starting point the ques-
tion of whether the evaluation of such a type system ‘loses information’,
we consider the parametrized typing associated with connectives from this
viewpoint.
The answer to this question implies that, within full categorical models
of meaning, the objects associated with types must exhibit a simple but
subtle categorical property known as self-similarity. We investigate the
category theory behind this, with explicit reference to typed systems, and
their monoidal closed structure. We then demonstrate close connections
between such self-similar structures and dagger Frobenius algebras. In
particular, we demonstrate that the categorical structures implied by the
polymorphically typed connectives give rise to a (lax unitless) form of the
special forms of Frobenius algebras known as classical structures, used
heavily in abstract categorical approaches to quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
A recent trend in linguistics [7] is to extend linguistic models of meaning from
words to sentences. Either implicitly or explicitly, this is done via a type system
– based on a categorical grammar – equipped with a notion of evaluation. This
notion of evaluation is crucial, in that it is used to reduce all grammatically
correct sentences to the same type, where they may be compared and their
similarity evaluated. In this chapter, we describe this typing and evaluation
process in an abstract categorical setting, based around a toy example.
We then consider the deceptively simple question of whether this evaluation
process (mapping all grammatically correct sentences to entities of the same
type) is reversible or not – i.e. does evaluation lose information? Our conclu-
sion is that in general, forgetting information is an inevitable and crucial part
of this process. However, we also demonstrate that connectives are a special
case, having an entirely reversible interpretation. Following this observation
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to its inevitable mathematical conclusion, we discover a connection between
reversibility and polymorphic typing, in both the linguistic and logical sense.
The relevant structures are familiar from a wide range of settings, ranging
from models of lambda calculus and the Geometry of Interaction, to fractals,
tilings, and the Thompson groups. This chapter demonstrates a further close
connection with abstract categorical models of quantum mechanics. Precisely,
we derive a (lax, infinitary) form of the special sort of Frobenius algebras known
as classical structures, around which categorical approaches to quantum infor-
mation and computation are based.
2 Introducing typing to models of meaning
The method of comparing meaning of words known as distributional semantics
is well-knownand as such, we restrict our description to the features that will be
particularly relevant to the typing process. We then give a simple example of
how typing, along with an evaluation operation, is used to allow the comparison
of quantities in physics. This is followed by a formal description of what we mean
by a typed system, based around the theory of monoidal closed categories, and
an indication of how we expect such a categorical typing in models of meaning
to allow us to compare arbitrary sentences, regardless of their grammatical
structure.
As described in Chapter 6, distributional semantics provides a method of
associating a vector (the meaning vector) with each word in a dictionary, based
on its usage in some corpus. Vectors may then be compared with each other,
using any of the familiar tools from linear algebra (generally, the scalar product),
giving a measure of the similarity, or overlap between words. The simple but
ambitious aim is to extend this to extend this process to sentences, rather than
single words, using the following scheme:
1. Single words are assigned types, based on their role; this typing is extended
to sentences, which are typed by their grammatical structure.
2. Associated with the type system is an evaluation, or reduction, process
that reduces all grammatically correct sentences to elements of the same
type (this is, as described elsewhere, a common approach in categorical
linguistics).
3. Crucially, elements of the same type can be compared, providing a method
of comparing the meaning of grammatically distinct sentences, in a similar
way to distributional semantics.
It hardly needs emphasising that this is a very ambitious program; instead of
aiming to provide a complete or partial solution, this chapter describes features
that such a model of meaning necessarily requires, at the level of the types.
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3 What is a type?
To a categorical logician, the answer is straightforward: a type is an object in a
(monoidal, closed) category. To explain this, we first give a simple example of
typing in basic physics, followed by the formal definition, and an illustration of
why such a type system would also be useful in linguistic models of meaning.
3.1 Types in elementary physics
A simple, but illustrative, example of a typed system comes from basic physics,
where the units of measurement may be thought of as the types of quantities.
The familiar seven basic SI units (kilogram (kg), second (s), metre (m), lu-
men (lm), &c.) are the fundamental types, and further types may be built up
recursively, using these base types and two operations known as pairing and
abstraction1:
• (Pairing) Given two types S, T , the pair type ST may be formed. For
example luminous energy is measured in lumen seconds, and hence has
type lm s.
• (Abstraction) Given two types L,M , the abstraction type ML−1 may
be formed. For example velocity is given in metres per second, and hence
has type m s−1.
Associated with such a type system is a notion of evaluation or reduction. A
quantity of type Y X−1 may be combined with a quantity of type X to return a
quantity of type Y . For example, let us calculate how far light, with a velocity
of c = 2.997× 108ms−1, travels in 1.3s.
(2.998× 108)ms−1 × 1.3s = 3.897× 108m (1)
Considering the typing only, we see a reduction of the form
ms−1 × s Eval.−→ m (2)
In this case, evaluation is simply the operation of multiplication2. Thus, we
observe that the type system for SI units is in fact commutative (i.e. the type
XY is identical to the type Y X). As a simple consequence of this, ordering is
irrelevant, and (for example) ms−1 is equivalent to s−1m. In general, and in
categorical linguistics in particular, neither commutativity nor symmetry (i.e.
commutativity up to isomorphism) may be assumed. To avoid ambiguity, we
will therefore use type-theoretic notation, and write either [S → T ] or [T ← S]
instead of TS−1. Strictly, this means that we should consider two distinct
1Pairing and abstraction are more commonly called product and quotient. We avoid this
terminology since these are neither products nor quotients in the categorical sense.
2In general, evaluation in a typed system may be significantly more complex; theoretical
computer scientists will be familiar with evaluation as either β-reduction in lambda calculus,
or the execution of a Turing machine [25, 18]
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evaluation operations; however, the required evaluation is often clear from the
context, so for simplicity of notation we do not distinguish between the two,
unless absolutely essential.
3.2 How we wish to use types in models of meaning
By analogy with how types are used in the above simple example, we wish to
consider models of meaning where words and phrases are typed according to
their grammatical structure, and the evaluation operation associated with the
type system reduces all (grammatically correct) sentences to the same type —
the sentence type S.
Consider the simplest possible sentence structure:
(Noun Phrase , Intransitive Verb)
If we assume that the noun phase is of some primitive type NP , an intransitive
verb can only have type [NP → S], where S is the sentence type. The reduction
of the sentence to the type S then proceeds by direct analogy with Equation 2:
NP × [NP → S] Eval.−→ S (3)
3.3 Monoidal closed categories
The above notions may be formalised in the field of category theory. We refer to
Chapter 1 for the basic notions of (monoidal) category theory; however, we will
be forced to take a more formal approach, and explicitly consider the structural
isomorphisms:
Definition 3.1. Symmetric monoidal categories
A monoidal category is defined to be a category C, together with a functor
⊗ : C × C → C that satisfies, for all A,B,C ∈ Ob(C):
• Unit objects There exists I ∈ Ob(C) satisfying I ⊗A ∼= A ∼= A⊗ I.
• Associativity A⊗ (B ⊗ C) ∼= (A⊗B)⊗ C.
If a monoidal category satisfies the additional condition
• symmetry A⊗B ∼= B ⊗A.
it is called a symmetric monoidal category. The above isomorphisms ex-
hibiting associativity or symmetry are natural, and satisfy various coherence
conditions laid out in [30].
Due to MacLane’s celebrated coherence theorem for associativity, we may
treat the associativity isomorphisms as though they are strict identities — so we
not distinguish between A⊗ (B ⊗C) and (A⊗B)⊗C. We follow this practice
until Section 8, where the distinction between the two will become important.
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Definition 3.2. Monoidal closed categories
Let (C,⊗) be a monoidal category. We say that it is monoidal closed when
there exists a functor
[ → ] : Cop × C → C
called the internal hom functor, such that for fixed B ∈ Ob(C), the functors
given by
[B → ] : C → C and ⊗B : C → C
form an adjoint pair. Equivalently, for all X,Y, Z ∈ Ob(C), there exists a natural
isomorphism
C(X ⊗ Y, Z) ∼= C(X, [Y → Z])
The above definition is concise, albeit very abstract (for example, we refer
to [30] for the definition of an adjoint pair of functors). Instead we use the
following characterisation that makes the existence and role of an evaluation
map central:
Theorem 3.3. The above definition of a monoidal closed category is equivalent
to the following:
For every pair of objects A,B ∈ Ob(C), there exists
• an object [A→ B] ∈ Ob(C),
• an arrow EvalA,B ∈ C(A⊗ [A→ B], B)
where, for all f : A⊗X → B, there exists unique g ∈ C(X, [A→ B]) such that
the following diagram commutes:
A⊗X f //
1A⊗g &&
B
A⊗ [A→ B]
EvalA,B
OO
Proof. Proofs may be found in any text on category theory or categorical logic
(e.g. [30, 25]). 2
3.4 Monoidal closed categories as type systems
The connection between the theory of monoidal closed categories, and the (very
elementary) type system presented in Section 3 should then be straightforward.
More generally, we take a categorical perspective, and define a type as an object
in a monoidal closed category. The operation of pairing from Section 3 is then
simply the monoidal tensor ⊗ , and the operation of abstraction from the same
section is the internal hom functor [ → ]. Finally, the reduction operation is
simply the evaluation derived in Theorem 3.3.
The question then arises: in this setting, what is an quantity of a certain
type, and how may such quantities be compared?
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3.5 Elements, scalars, daggers and duals
The objects of a monoidal closed category do not come equipped with a notion
of membership, so it it not accurate to talk about ‘ a member x of some object
N ’. Instead we have the notion of elements of an object.
Definition 3.4. Given a monoidal category (C,⊗, I), an element of some
object N ∈ Ob(C) is a member of C(I,N) i.e. an arrow from I to N . The
category (C,⊗, I) is called well-pointed when, for all f 6= g ∈ C(X,Y ), there
exists some element a ∈ C(I,X) such that fa 6= ga ∈ C(I, Y ).
For well-pointed categories, it is easy to see how the notion of elements is a
reasonable replacement for the notion of membership. Most of this chapter is
based on elements of a category, and their interaction with the monoidal struc-
ture, and the categories with which we work are generally well-pointed. We will
point out when results depend on this assumption, or when we are (unusually)
referring to a non well-pointed category.
In order to compare elements of an object, we need a small amount of extra
structure:
Definition 3.5. A dagger operation on a category C is a (contravariant) invo-
lutive endofunctor, usually written ( )† : Cop → C that is the identity on objects,
so A† = A for all A ∈ Ob(C). An arrow f ∈ C(A,B) satisfying f†f = 1A
is called an isometry, and when this is a two-sided inverse (so f† is also an
isometry), then f is called unitary.
Let ⊗ be a monoidal tensor on C. When the monoidal structure has a
well-behaved interaction with the dagger operation (that is, all canonical isomor-
phisms are unitary), then (C,⊗, ( )†) is called a dagger monoidal category.
Dagger monoidal categories provide us with exactly the structure we need
to compare elements:
Definition 3.6. Following [1], arrows from I to itself in a monoidal category
with daggers are called abstract scalars. Given two elements of the same
object x, y ∈ C(I,X), their generalised inner product is the endomorphism
of the unit object given by
〈x|y〉 = x†y ∈ C(I, I)
Thus generalised inner products act as comparisons, give a result that is an
arrow from the unit object to itself. This fits in well with our usual intuition of
what it means to compare the similarity of elements, in that in various settings
C(I, I)| is (for example) the real line R, the complex plane C, the natural num-
bers N, the unit interval [0, 1], etc. We take care to avoid using categories where
the endomorphism monoid of the unit object is trivial (e.g. globally defined
functions, relations on sets, vector spaces with direct sum as monoidal tensor,
etc.).
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Proposition 3.7. Let (C,⊗, I) be a monoidal category.
1. C(I, I) is an abelian monoid.
2. Up to canonical isomorphism, α⊗ β = αβ = βα.
3. When C is a dagger monoidal category, then for all X,Y ∈ Ob(C) and
elements
a, b ∈ C(I,X) , c, d ∈ C(I, Y )
then
〈a⊗ c|b⊗ d〉 = 〈a|b〉 〈c|d〉
Proof. We refer to [1] for proofs.
Much of the terminology and notation used in dagger monoidal categories
comes from a canonical motivating example:
Example 3.8. This example is based on [2].
Complex finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces form a dagger monoidal category,
where the monoidal tensor is the usual tensor product, and the dagger is the
usual Hermitian adjoint ( )H . The unit object is then the underlying scalar
field, i.e. the complex plane C, and an endomorphism of the unit object is a lin-
ear map on a one-dimensional space — that is, multiplication by some complex
scalar.
Elements of some finite-dimensional space H are then simply linear maps
from C to H — which are, of course, in one-to-one correspondence with the
points of H. Moving from points of a space to linear maps of a space is exactly
the idea behind Dirac notation for states; instead of working with the point
ψ ∈ H, we work with the linear map |ψ〉 : C→ H. The (categorical) generalised
inner product is then exactly the composite |φ〉H |ψ〉, i.e. the usual inner product
〈φ|ψ〉 of vectors in a Hilbert space, expressed in Dirac notation.
We also refer to [2] for the monoidal closure of this category, and the quantum-
mechanical interpretation of the categorical operations such as evaluation and
the dagger.
In the above example, the generalised inner product is exactly the scalar
product of vectors, and may be used to define a metric on elements of a (finite-
dimensional) Hilbert space. Thus, because of the first metric axiom, the gener-
alised inner product may be used as a test of equality for elements. In other ex-
amples, (such as partial reversible functions on sets), the endomorphism monoid
of the unit object is trivial, and the generalised inner product provides little or
no information about elements. We axiomatise this distinction as follows:
Definition 3.9. Let (C,⊗, I( )†) be a dagger monoidal category. We say that
( ) : Cop → C discriminates elements of A ∈ Ob(C) when, for all x, y ∈
C(I,A),
〈x|y〉 = 1I ⇔ x = y ∈ C(I, A)
When ( )† : Cop → C discriminates elements of all objects of C, we simply say
that it discriminates elements.
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3.6 Elements, names, and evaluation
In a monoidal closed category, the elements of the object [X → Y ] ∈ Ob(C) have
a natural interpretation as arrows from X to Y within C, as the following result
makes clear:
Proposition 3.10. Let (C,⊗, [ , ], I) be a monoidal closed category. Then for all
objects X,Y ∈ Ob(C), there is a natural bijection between elements of [X → Y ],
and the homset C(X,Y ).
Proof. This is a standard result from the theory of closed categories and cate-
gorical logic [26, 25].
Definition 3.11. Given a monoidal closed category (C,⊗, [ , ], I), and an arrow
f ∈ C(X,Y ), then its image under the bijection of Proposition 3.10 above is
called the name of f ∈ C(X,Y ), written pfq ∈ C(I, [X → Y ]).
The intuitive meaning of evaluation is that it ‘promotes’ an element (i.e. the
name of an arrow pfq) to actual arrow within the category; more formally, the
following diagram is a special case of the diagram of Theorem 3.3.
A
f // B
A⊗ I
∼=
1A⊗pfq
// A⊗ [A→ B]
EvalA,B
OO
Thus, for example, we see that an element of the ‘intransitive verb’ object (as in
Section 3.2) may also be considered as an arrow from the ‘noun phrase’ object
to the ‘sentence’ object.
Given that elements of an object are themselves arrows in a category, it is
natural to wonder what the name of an element is, or indeed the name of the
name of an element, etc. Fortunately, such an eternal recurrence is avoided by
the fact that, up to canonical isomorphism, elements ‘name themselves’. Pre-
cisely, for any element x ∈ C(I, A) in a monoidal closed category, the following
diagram commutes:
I
∼= x
%%
I ⊗ I 1I⊗x //
1I⊗pxq &&
I ⊗A ∼= A
I ⊗ [I → A]
EvalI,A
99
Convention In the above diagram, lines denoting canonical coherence isomor-
phisms are simply labelled by “∼=”. We follow this convention throughout, unless
the precise coherence isomorphism is important.
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3.7 Types for linguistics and models of meaning
In categorical linguistics, a common method of characterising grammatically
correct sentences is to assign types (i.e. objects in a monoidal closed category)
to words in such a way that the evaluation map takes all grammatically correct
sentences to a single distinguished type S, called the sentence type. In particular
as shown in [7], this is the structure behind Lambek’s pregroup semantics and
other approaches to categorical linguistics. Thus, standard categorical models of
linguistics provide a type system for models of meaning applicable to arbitrary
sentences; however, we do not yet have actual elements, or any notion of how
these interact with the evaluation process, the generalised inner product, or
the monoidal tensor. An obvious analogy exists with the very powerful tool
of dimensional analysis in basic physics [20], which may be considered to be
the underlying type system behind the SI units of Section 3, abstracted from
consideration of actual quantities.
The remainder of this paper may be considered as an investigation of what
it would mean to (re)introduce actual elements to the type system provided
by categorical linguistics, and indeed what modifications must be made to the
typing to account for the fact that we are interested in meaning as well as
grammar.
3.8 Typed models of meaning — a toy example
In order to avoid becoming too abstract, we use a concrete example to illustrate
how the program described above may be used to compare two sentences. We
will use the following examples:
L1 Bobby loves Marilyn Monroe.
L2 I like Fidel Castro and his beard.
The classically educated reader will recognise these as lyrics from Bob Dylan
songs. (Note that one of these lyrics is from an improvised live performance
and is not part of the official Dylan canon [10]); our interest is in how a typed
model of meaning could be used to compare these distinct lyrics.
The first step we take is to instantiate the variable3 in L2; as we are familiar
with these sentences as Bob Dylan lyrics, it is reasonable to replace I by Bob
Dylan, and adjust the verb from the first to the third person, giving
L2′ Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro and his beard.
We draw these two sentences L1 and L2′ in tree form as shown in Figure 3.8,
and consider how both the individual constituents and the sentences as a whole
may be compared.
From these trees, we see that the basic grammatical components we require
are:
3Note that this is an exophoric reference since the pronoun I is not bound to any noun
phrase within the text itself.
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Figure 1: Trees for L1 and L2′
L1 loves
Bobby Marilyn
Monroe
L2′ likes
Bob
Dylan and
Fidel
Castro
his
beard
• Sentences (S) ‘Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro and his beard’, ‘Bobby loves
Marilyn Monroe’.
• Transitive Verbs (TV) likes, loves.
• Connectives (C) and.
• noun phrases (NP) Bob Dylan, Bobby, Marilyn Monroe, Fidel Castro,
Fidel Castro’s beard, Fidel Castro and his beard.
(We observe above that joining two noun phrases by a connective forms another
noun phrase. This possibility must be reflected in the typing associated with
connectives; this is explored further in Section 7 onwards).
3.9 Categorical features for a model of meaning
We now consider the requirements for some category Meaning in which the
meanings of L1 and L2′ may be evaluated and compared. We do not present a
concrete example; rather we use machinery developed to lay down requirements
that such a category must satisfy, and go on to consider the resulting categorical
theory.
For a type system that allows us to model grammatical structure and reduce
grammatical sentences to elements of the same type, we require a monoidal
closed structure, so Meaning is equipped with a monoidal tensor ( ⊗ ) :
Meaning ×Meaning →Meaning, a unit object I ∈ Ob(M), and an internal
hom, [ → ] : Meaningop ×Meaning → Meaning. In order to compare ele-
ments, we will also require a dagger operation ( )† : Meaningop →Meaning,
compatible with the monoidal tensor, giving a generalised scalar product.
10
As our analysis will be based on elements of objects, it is reasonable to
assume that (Meaning,⊗, [ → ], I, ( )†) is well-pointed (Definition 3.4). We
further assume that our model of meaning is complete, in the sense that distinct
concepts are not unnecessarily identified by the generalised scalar product4;
categorically, this requires that the dagger operation discriminates elements, in
the sense of Definition 3.9.
The category Meaning must also contain objects corresponding to the
grammatical components given in Section 3.8 above. Thus NP,C, TV, S ∈
Ob(Meaning) are the objects corresponding to the noun phrase, connective,
transitive verb, sentence types; we take the noun phrase and sentence types
NP,S ∈ Ob(M) as primitive and build up the others in terms of their desired
behaviour under evaluation.
Finally, for illustrative purposes, we takeMeaning(I, I) to be the unit inter-
val [0, 1]. The putative interpretation is that 〈x|y〉 = 1 means complete equality
of meaning between elements x and y, whereas 〈x|y〉 = 0 means that they have
nothing in common. Composition of endomorphism arrows of the unit object
is, as per the requirements of Proposition 3.7, simply multiplication.
3.10 Comparing simple nouns
Let us start with the respective subjects of L1 and L2′, the noun phrases Bobby
and Bob Dylan. In a suitable typed system, these will be represented by two
distinct elements of type NP
I
Bobby// NP I
Bob Dylan // NP
These elements may be compared by computing their generalised inner product,
giving
I
Bobby //
〈Bobby|Bob Dylan〉
''
NP
Bob Dylan†

I
Although this chapter does not present a concrete model of meaning, observe
that the above comparison would be straightforward, using the distributional
semantics approach described in Chapter 6. In the absence of any concrete data,
we make a guess for illustrative purposes, and write
〈Bobby|Bob Dylan〉 = 0.98 ∈Meaning(I, I)
Giving a high, if not perfect overlap5 between Bobby and Bob Dylan.
4This is not always a reasonable assumption to make, depending on the intended purpose
of our model of meaning. In particular, the very successful field of sentiment analysis [23]
makes an entirely different assumption!
5Readers familiar with 20th Century US culture might assume that Bobby in L1 instead
refers to Robert Kennedy. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it is neither apparent
from the individual lines, nor the songs as a whole. Interpreting texts in their appropriate
historical and cultural context is a significant challenge for models of meaning generally.
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3.11 Comparing transitive verbs
We now compare the central verbs of L1 and L2′, i.e. we wish to assign a value
to the generalised inner product 〈likes|loves〉. However, it is worth considering
the typing that these elements must have. Recall from Section 3.2 that an
intransitive verb can only have type [NP → S]. Thus, we wish a transitive verb
to have a suitable type so that, when given an object (i.e. a noun phrase) on
its right hand side, it returns something of type [N → S]. Thus, an intransitive
verb must have type [[NP → S]← NP ].
The comparison of likes and loves is the following generalised inner product
I
loves //
〈likes|loves〉
))
[[N → S]← N ]
likes†

I
We again make an arbitrary guess6 and write
〈likes|loves〉 = 0.75 ∈Meaning(I, I)
3.12 Comparing noun phrases
In terms of comparing the primitive elements of L1 and L2, it now remains
to compare the two objects of the transitive verbs: Marilyn Monroe, and Fidel
Castro and his beard. Leaving aside for the moment the details of how two noun
phrases may be combined with a connective to produce a further noun phrase, we
are happy to declare that there never has been any significant overlap between
Marilyn Monroe and Fidel Castro and his beard. Thus, our educated guess at
this point is simply that
〈Marilyn Monroe|Fidel Castro and his beard〉 = 0 ∈Meaning(I, I)
4 Comparing words vs. comparing sentences
Bringing together the (entirely fictitious) values for the overlap between the
meanings of words introduced above, we have the table shown in Figure 4.
The crucial question is whether these three values are enough to compare the
meaning of L1 and L2′ ? We first appeal to part 3 of Proposition 3.7, we may
compute the generalised inner product of L1 and L2′, considered as elements of
type NP ⊗ [[NP → S]← NP ]⊗NP .
Proposition 4.1. Using the values for the generalised scalar products of indi-
vidual word proposed in Sections 3.10 - 3.12, the inner product of the elements
L1 : I → NP ⊗ [[NP → S]← NP ]⊗NP
6Based on a talk by Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh (Oxford, Oct. 2010), where denotational se-
mantics was introduced using the illustration that “likes is 3
4
loves and 1
4
hates”.
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L2′ : I → NP ⊗ [[NP → S]← NP ]⊗NP
is exactly 〈L1|L2′〉 = 0 ∈Meaning(I, I).
Proof. This follows from the values given in Figure 4, and part 3 of Proposition
3.7, where the interaction of generalised inner products and monoidal tensors is
given.
However, we have compared these sentences before any evaluation has taken
place — and the whole point of the typing system was that all well-formed sen-
tences evaluate to the same sentence type S. The key question is then whether
this matters, i.e.
Is comparison of sentences invariant under evaluation?
5 Inner products, evaluation, and inverses
The question at the end of Section 4 above should properly be considered as
two distinct questions:
1. Does the evaluation arrow EvalA,B =∈ C(A⊗ [A→ B], B) preserve inner
products?
2. When the meaning of a word is some name pfq ∈ C(I, [X → Y ]), does the
arrow f ∈ C(X,Y ) preserve inner products?
Question 1 is a fundamentally category-theoretic question, whereas question 2
is about how we expect categorical models of meaning to behave. In a dag-
ger monoidal closed category (C,⊗, [ → ], ( )†), both isometries and unitaries
preserve generalised inner products, and the canonical isomorphisms for the
monoidal structure are unitary. Therefore, any dagger monoidal category con-
tains inner product preserving arrows – question 2 is simply asking whether any
of these have a role to play in models of meaning.
As we are working within a well-pointed monoidal category with a dagger
that discriminates elements, both these questions are about whether various
categorical operations ‘lose information’, as the following result demonstrates:
Lemma 5.1. Let (C,⊗, ( )†) be a well-pointed dagger monoidal category where
the dagger discriminates elements, and let F ∈ C(A,B) preserve generalised
Figure 2: Comparisons of individual words in L1 and L2
Bobby loves Marilyn Monroe.
Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro and his beard.
〈Bobby|Bob Dylan〉 〈likes|loves〉 〈Fidel & his beard|Marilyn Monroe〉
= = =
0.98 0.75 0.00
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scalar products, Then F is an isometry, i.e. F † ∈ C(B,A) is a left inverse of
F ∈ C(A,B).
Proof. Consider arbitrary elements of x, y ∈ C(I, A). As F preserves inner
products, the following diagram commutes:
A
F // B
F † // A
y†

I
x
OO
x // A
y† // I
Simplifying this commuting diagram, we have
B
F †
		
I
x // A
F
GG
y† // I
Thus, as C is well-pointed with a dagger that discriminates elements, we deduce
that F † is a left inverse of F .
Note that the above result does not prove that F † is a two-sided inverse;
indeed, in arbitrary Hilbert spaces, the inner-product preserving isomorphisms
are exactly the unitary maps, whereas inner product preserving linear maps are
simply isometries (which do indeed have a left inverse, but not necessarily a
two-sided inverse).
6 Does evaluation preserve inner products?
We first address Question 1 of Section 5 above: is the evaluation map an isom-
etry – i.e. is its dagger also a left inverse?
Given elements x, y of an object A ⊗ [A → B] in some monoidal closed
category with a discriminating dagger, we may form elements of B by composing
both x and y with the canonical evaluation map EvalA,B : A ⊗ [A → B] → B
as shown below:
I
x //
EvalA,Bx
##
A⊗ [A→ B]
EvalA,B

I
yoo
EvalA,By
{{
B
From Lemma 5.1, a necessary condition for the the following diagram to com-
mute
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A⊗ [A→ B]
x†
%%
I
y
99
EvalA,By %%
Commutes? I
B
(EvalA,Bx)
†
99
is that EvalAB has a left inverse. Leaving aside the irrelevant (for our pur-
poses) case where C does not have a discriminating dagger, in general the above
diagram does not commute. One of the simplest counterexamples is the mo-
tivating example of Example 3.8, and quantum-mechanical interpretations of
its categorical properties, where Evaluation interprets as (post-selected partial)
measurement against a maximally entangled basis [2]. Of course, one of the most
fundamental features of the Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics is that
measurement (partial or total) is certainly not a reversible operation. Other
examples include models of logic or lambda calculus, where evaluation is either
β-reduction, or cut-elimination — neither of which are reversible operations7.
The question is whether this is desirable or undesirable for a model of mean-
ing? The linguistic justification for the answer to the second question of Section
5 helps demonstrate that it is in fact desirable.
6.1 Forgetfulness - a linguistic justification
We now address Question 2 from Section 5. The claim that we make is that it
is vital for the evaluation process to be irreversible, since we need it to forget
information — it is highly desirable that the arrows named by elements in our
models of meaning do not have inverses.
As a motivating example, consider the simple noun phrase scruffy cats, built
up from an adjective and another noun phrase:
I
scruffy// AD I
cats // NP
The noun phrase cats is a simple element of the object NP , and from its
behaviour we deduce that an adjective has typing AD = [NP ← NP ]. The
term scruffy cats, before any reduction, is therefore is the following element:
I
scruffy ⊗ cats // [NP ← NP ]⊗NP
Momentarily forgetting about typing questions, let us assume that the ‘meaning’
of both scruffy and cats has been derived using some variant of the distribu-
tional semantics described in Chapter 6. The ‘meaning’ of cats will then provide
7We do not claim that in any monoidal closed category, the evaluation arrow cannot be
invertible. In particular, monoidal closed categories of partial reversible functions, where
all objects are isomorphic, have been constructed in [15, 16, 3]. Leaving these rather esoteric
examples aside, our claim is that a (much more usual) irreversible evaluation is highly desirable
and useful for typed models of meaning
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information about cats generally, whether scruffy, tidy, or invisible. Similarly,
the adjective scruffy provides information about the general concept of scruffi-
ness, whether applied to cats, dogs, or academics.
From Proposition 3.10, an element scruffy ∈ Meaning(I, [NP ← NP ]) is
the name of some arrow ˜scruffy ∈ Meaning(NP,NP ). We then see that, at
least in this setting, the arrow named by scruffy ∈Meaning(I, [NP ← NP ])
has something of the nature of a projector, or a partial identity, in that it acts
to restrict a concept to a special case.
The above is not, of course, a formal justification. However, we also ob-
serve that reduction is often a multi-stage process, and the ability to com-
pare sentences or sentence fragments at different levels may be a highly useful
feature of a typed model of meaning. Consider sentences s0, t0 of some com-
pound type [S ← X]⊗ Y ⊗ [Y → X]. This compound type may be reduced to
S ∈ Ob(Meaning) in two stages.
[S ← X]⊗ Y ⊗ [Y → X]
1⊗EvalY,X

I
s2,t2
**
s1,t1 //
s0,t0
55
[S ← X]⊗X
EvalX,S

S
given that 〈s0|t0〉 6= 〈s1|t1〉 6= 〈s2|t2〉, we observe that it is possible to compare
sentences at many different levels, depending on how much reduction has been
carried out. This unusual feature may prove useful in dealing with ambiguity, or
indeed in assigning meaning to non-compositional phrases such as Iron Curtain,
where the meaning of this phrase is not derived by restricting the information
about all possible curtains to those made of iron.
7 How to type connectives?
We have taken a digression in our aim of comparing the meaning of two distinct
Bob Dylan lyrics; in particular, we left the question of how to deal with con-
nectives unanswered. This was intentional, in that – as we demonstrate below –
the behaviour of connectives is closely connected with questions of reversibility
and evaluation.
Recall that we treated the noun phrases
1. Marilyn Monroe
2. Fidel Castro and his beard
simply as two distinct noun phrases. However, 2 above is clearly the conjunction
of two distinct noun phrases; rather than being a noun phrase itself, it is a
compound that should evaluate to a noun phrase. The question then, is simply,
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how should we type and ? As the typing will prove rather intricate, we first
consider an alternative method of dealing with connectives:
7.1 Distributivity and conjunction
A common point of view is that, given a sentence containing the conjunction of
two noun phrases, it should simply be split in two using distributivity, and the
two sentences treated separately. For example, using distributivity,
L2 Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro and his beard
would be replaced by
L2a Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro.
L2b Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro’s beard.
This seems to be valid from a grammatical point of view, and (assuming we
resolve the anaphor his before applying distributivity) the meaning of L1 is
indeed the conjunction of L1a and L1b. However, this is not always the case.
Consider the following sentence:
T Fidel Castro and Marilyn Monroe played tennis
Applying distributivity, we get the (grammatically correct)
Ta Fidel Castro played tennis.
Tb Marilyn Monroe played tennis.
Intuitively, we are happy to believe the conjunction of Ta and Tb, but find T
rather implausible – since tennis is generally an activity indulged in by two
people, we deduce that it was a joint, shared game of tennis.
Although the above example is somewhat facetious, the question of when
and whether applying distributivity changes meaning has been heavily studied
[35], including in a legal context [34]. See [14] for a particular case involving
arguments on whether distributivity is applicable to conjunction in the phrase
“to keep and bear arms”, and whether doing so changes the meaning of this
phrase. It appears that, when we consider meaning as well as grammatical
correctness, we are forced to consider how the connectives ( and, or, etc.) are
typed, and behave under evaluation.
7.2 Typing connectives and polymorphism
The first problem is that although (based on its usage in L1) we might simply
wish to type and as an element of [[NP → NP ] ← NP ] (or equivalently,
[NP → [NP ← NP ]]), the word ‘and’ is used in other settings, as Figure 7.2
demonstrates.
However, in every case, the appropriate typing appears to be
[[X → X]← X]
17
Figure 3: Conjunction as a polymorphic connective
Conjunction in different contexts
Noun phrases Fidel Castro and his beard
Transitive verbs Bobby loves and obeys Marilyn Monroe
Adjectives Fidel’s big and bushy beard
Sentences Bobby likes Fidel and I like Marilyn Monroe
where X ranges over types, according to context. The same phenomenon ap-
pears to apply to other binary connectives8 Thus, it appears that the typing of
binary connectives is polymorphic. We refer to [33] for the notion of parametrised
types in computer science, and [11] for System F, the polymorphic lambda cal-
culus. Borrowing notation from this polymorphic lambda calculus, we write the
type of and as
ΛX.[[X → X]← X]
We do not give a full treatment in terms of the polymorphic lambda calculus;
rather we simply treat this as shorthand for the following: Given some binary
connective B, then the type of B is dependent on the context; given some
element of type
U ⊗B ⊗ V
together with evaluation arrows EvalU,X and EvalV,X , then the ‘polymorphi-
cally typed’ connective B provides us with some element BX of type
X → [X ← X] or equiv. [X → X]← X
7.3 Forgetfulness and binary connectives
In Section 6.1, we make an argument, based on linguistic interpretation, that the
arrows of a category named by word of various types are forgetful — they lose
8e.g. or may be substituted for and in any of the above. Also, although English does not
have a single connective corresponding to ‘exclusive or’, one could easily conceive of sentences
such as I like exactly one of Fidel Castro and his beard, which would behave in a similar way.
However, the same does not hold for implies, which is generally applied to entire sentences
only.
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information, the example given being how adjectives should, in certain cases,
act as projectors or partial identities, on noun phrases. However, it is clear
that the connectives do not follow this general principle: when we use and to
concatenate two sentences (or noun phrases, adverbs, &c.), we do not expect to
lose any information about the constituents in this conjunction.
As a trivial example, consider taking some body of text, and replacing each
full stop (period) by “and”. Although legibility will rapidly be lost, it would
be difficult to claim that any meaning or content has been erased. Thus, the
element
I
andX // [X → [X ← X]]
is the name of an arrow inMeaning(X, [X ← X]) that is information-preserving
in the sense laid out in Section 5 and Section 6.1. We consider the implications
of this shortly, but first use some abstract category theory to simplify the types
of arrows being named.
7.4 Revisiting types of connectives
In order to make a considerable simplification of the resulting theory, we now
make the assumption that the left evaluation arrow and the right evaluation
arrow are identical (at least, up to some canonical symmetry isomorphism).
Although there is no decisive linguistic justification for this in general9, it is
certainly satisfied by compact closed categories [22], which feature heavily in
models of linguistics and meaning such as the vector spaces as used in dis-
tributional semantics, the more general models of meaning of [7], and purely
grammatical models such as Lambek pregroups [24].
Given this assumption, we may appeal to the defining equations of monoidal
closure, from Definition 3.2, and – up to isomorphism – replace elements of type
Meaning((I, [X → [X ← X]]) by elements of typeMeaning(I, [X⊗X → X]).
Thus (up to some canonical isomorphism that we elide in the following sec-
tions), a polymorphic connective such as and determines a family of elements
and(X) ∈Meaning(I, [X ⊗X → X])
where X ranges over various objects, including {S,NP,AD, TV, . . .}. Further,
as demonstrated in Section 7.3 above, in each case andX is the name of some
arrow a˜ndX ∈ Meaning(X ⊗X,X) that preserves generalised inner products,
and thus (from Lemma 5.1) has a left inverse given by its dagger.
7.5 Do arrows named by connectives have a right inverse?
In Section 7.3 above, we made the case that the object-indexed family of arrows
named by the connective and (and, quite possibly, other binary connectives) are
information-preserving, in the sense that they are isometries – i.e their adjoint
9although since the connectives and and or appear to be symmetric, this assumption is
indeed justified for the particular examples we consider.
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is a left inverse, and thus they preserve the generalised inner product. In fact,
it is easy to make a case that their adjoint should be a two-sided inverse, and
they are thus unitary10. The justification for this is (for the connective and, in
the case of the sentence object S) is that, given some sentence W ∈ C(I, S), we
can always find some pair of sentences U, V ∈ C(I, S) such that the (evaluation
of the) sentence U ⊗ and ⊗ V has exactly the same intended meaning as W .
A similar argument can be made for other objects in Meaning, and for other
binary connectives.
7.6 Frobenius algebras and self-similarity
We have seen that, for every polymorphic connective c and appropriate object
X ∈ Ob(Meaning), there exists some isomorphism c˜X ∈ Meaning(X ⊗X,X)
whose inverse is its dual c˜X
−1
= c˜X
† ∈ Meaning(X → X ⊗ X), and thus
X ∼= X ⊗ X i.e. the object X is self-similar in the sense of [15, 16]. The
question we now address is whether, at least up to canonical isomorphism, this
self-similarity gives rise to a Frobenius algebra structure at each of these objects
in the category Meaning.
Frobenius algebras in categories, definitions, diagrammatics, various special
cases and applications and well covered in other chapters, so the following ex-
position is brief. In particular, we refer to Chapter 7 for more detailed theory,
and refer to Chapter 1 for a suitable string-diagram formalism.
Definition 7.1. A Frobenius algebra in a monoidal category (C,⊗, I) consists
of a monoid structure (∇ : S ⊗ S → S,⊥ : I → S) and a comonoid structure
(∆ : S → S ⊗ S,> : S → I) at the same object, where the monoid / comonoid
pair satisfy the Frobenius condition
∆∇ = (1S ⊗∆)(∇⊗ 1S) ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S ⊗ S)
Expanding out the definitions of a monoid and a comonoid structure, we have:
1. (associativity) ∇(1S ⊗∇) = ∇(∇⊗ 1S) ∈ C(S ⊗ S ⊗ S, S).
2. (co-associativity) (∆⊗ 1S)∆ = (1S ⊗∆)∆ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S ⊗ S).
3. (unit) ∇(⊥⊗ 1S) = ∇(1S ⊗⊥).
4. (co-unit) (>⊗S)∆ = 1X ⊗>)∆.
An immediate observation is that the above axioms for the monoid / comonoid
structure ignore coherence isomorphisms. In particular, they assume strict as-
sociativity – or at least, ignore the role of associativity isomorphisms. The same
also holds for the Frobenius condition, since 1S ⊗ ∆ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S ⊗ (S ⊗ S))
10We also observe that, even if this assumption should prove to be unfounded, the resulting
mathematical structures will be almost identical; should we be forced to deal with some
isometry cX ∈ Meaning(X ⊗ X → X) that has a left inverse, but not a right inverse, the
appropriate mathematical tool will prove to be the Karoubi envelope, or splitting idempotents
construction [30], as applied to exactly this situation in [15, 17].
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whereas ∇ ⊗ 1S ∈ C((S ⊗ S) ⊗ S, S ⊗ S). With this in mind, we make the
following definition:
Definition 7.2. A lax Frobenius algebra in a monoidal category (C,⊗, I)
is defined to be an object S ∈ Ob(C) along with arrows
∆ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) , ∇ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) , > ∈ C(S, I) , ⊥ ∈ C(I, S)
that satisfies the axioms of Definition 7.1 above, up to canonical coherence iso-
morphisms.
It is also sometimes useful to consider structures that satisfy all the axioms
for a Frobenius algebra – whether lax or strict – except those relating to the
unit object (i.e. the existence of the arrows >,⊥, and axioms 3.-4. above).
Such structures (S,∆,∇) are called unitless Frobenius algebras. These are
particularly relevant when working with the unitless monoidal categories of def-
inition 8.4 onwards.
Our claim, to be justified over the following sections, is that the arrows
named by connectives do indeed provide (lax, unitless) Frobenius algebras in
the category Meaning. However, the details of the exact canonical coherence
isomorphisms required are subtle — and quite possibly controversial; we first
need an in-depth investigation of the categorical structure of self-similarity.
8 Self-similarity, categorically
In this section, and the following sections, we do not appeal to MacLane’s co-
herence theorem for associativity, and treat all associativity isomorphisms as
though they were strict identities. For justification, we refer to Isbell’s argu-
ment (quoted by MacLane in [30] as justification for introducing associativity
up to isomorphism) and give an updating of Isbell’s argument to a more general
setting in Appendix B.
Definition 8.1. Let (C,⊗, I) be a monoidal category. A self-similar struc-
ture (S,,) is defined to be an object S ∈ Ob(C), together with two mutually
inverse arrows
• (code)  ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S).
• (decode)  ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S).
satisfying  = 1S⊗S and  = 1S, so the following diagram commutes.
S ⊗ S

''
S

hh 1See1S⊗S
""
When there is a self-similar structure at some object S ∈ Ob(C), we say (using
the terminology of [15, 16]) that S is a self-similar object. Note that there
may be many distinct self-similar structures at the same object.
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When (C,⊗, ( )†) is a dagger monoidal category, and  = −1 = †, we say
that (S,,) is a dagger- self-similar structure.
Motivating examples include the natural numbers N in various categories
(relations, partial functions, partial reversible functions, &c.) with respect to
various monoidal tensors (Cartesian product, disjoint union). Other examples
arise in the study of fractals (the Cantor set [15], and fractals in general [29]),
logical models such as Scott’s celebrated domain-theoretic models of the untyped
lambda calculus (see [25] for a categorical exposition), inverse semigroups and
tilings [27, 21], The Thompson groups [28], and the Cuntz C∗ algebras [8].
Although there is a close connection between such self-similar structures and
the canonical coherence isomorphisms of a monoidal category [17], we emphasise
that for any given object S, there are generally many self-similar structures.
Simple cardinality arguments demonstrate that the set of bijections {f : N →
N unionmulti N} is uncountable; this is expanded on in Appendix A, where an explicit
correspondence between interior points of the Cantor set and order-preserving
bijections from N to N unionmulti N is given.
Despite this, the maps between self-similar structures are particularly simple:
Definition 8.2. Given two self-similar structures (S,1,1) and (S,2,2) at
some object S of a symmetric monoidal category (C,⊗), a morphism between
them is an arrow u ∈ C(S, S) such that the following diagram commutes:
S ⊗ S
1
||
2
""
S
u
// S
Proposition 8.3. Let u : (S,1,1) → (S,2,2) be a morphism of self-
similar structures. Then u : S → S is the isomorphism given by u = 21.
Proof. By definition of a self-similar structure, the following diagram commutes:
S ⊗ S 1 //
2

S
1

u
zz
S S ⊗ S2oo
and hence u = 21. When these are dagger self-similar structures, it is also
trivially unitary.
Thus, with this definition of morphism, self-similar structures at some object
S ∈ Ob(C) form a skeletal category, where there is exactly one arrow between
any two objects.
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8.1 The generalised convolution functor
Given an arbitrary object of a monoidal category (C,⊗), it generates a subcat-
egory of C in the obvious way:
Definition 8.4. Let T be an arbitrary object of a monoidal category (C,⊗, I).
We define the category T⊗ generated by T and ⊗ to be the wide subcategory
of C with the following inductively defined objects:
• T ∈ Ob(T⊗).
• Given A,B ∈ Ob(T⊗), then A⊗B ∈ Ob(T⊗).
It is immediate that T⊗ is closed under the monoidal tensor on both arrows and
objects, and hence has all the structure of a monoidal category apart from the
unit object I. Such categories are called unitless monoidal categories.
Unitless monoidal categories are (trivially) not well-pointed. However – as in
the above example – they may arise as subcategories of well-pointed categories.
Proposition 8.5. Given a self-similar structure (S,,) in a monoidal cate-
gory (C,⊗), then for every X ∈ Ob(S⊗), there exists isomorphisms
X : S → X , X = −1X : X → S
Proof. We give these isomorphisms inductively:
• S = 1S = S
• X⊗Y = (X ⊗Y )
• X⊗Y = (X ⊗Y )
It is straightforward to verify that A ∈ C(S,A) and A ∈ C(A,S) are isomor-
phisms, and each others inverse. Similarly, when (S,,) is a dagger self-similar
structure then A = 
†
A ∈ C(A,S), for all A ∈ Ob(C).
For every self-similar structure (S,,) in some monoidal category (C,⊗)
there is an obvious functor from S⊗ to C(S, S), considered as a one-object
category:
Definition 8.6. Given a self-similar structure (S,,) in a monoidal category
(C,⊗), we define the generalised convolution functor
Φ : S
⊗ → C(S, S)
as follows:
• (Objects) Φ(X) = S for all X ∈ Ob(S⊗)
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• (Arrows) Given f ∈ S⊗(X,Y ), then Φ(f) = Y fX , as shown below:
X
f // Y
Y

S
X
OO
Φ(f)
// S
where Y : Y → S and X : S → X are as in Proposition 8.5.
Proposition 8.7. Given a self-similar structure (S,,) in a monoidal cate-
gory (C,⊗), the generalised convolution Φ : S⊗ → C(S, S) defined above
is indeed a functor. Further, when (C,⊗) is a dagger monoidal category, and
(S,,) is a dagger self similar object, then the functor Φ preserves the
dagger, so
Φ(f
†) = (Φ(f))
†
Proof. We refer to [15] for proof that Φ : S
⊗ → C(S, S) is indeed a functor.
Now assume that (S,,) is a dagger self-similar structure. By definition, for
arbitrary f ∈ S⊗(X,Y )
(Φ(f))
†
= (Y fX)
†
= (Φ(f))
†
= †Xf
††Y
By Proposition 8.5 above, †Y = Y and
†
X = X , so (Φ(f))
†
= Xf
†Y =
Φ(f
†) as required.
8.2 Untyped monoidal categories
As well as being functorial Φ : S
⊗ → C(S, S) preserves many categorical
properties, such as monoidal structures, categorical closure, categorical traces,
etc. ([16]). We briefly outline how this gives C(S, S) the structure of a (one-
object) monoidal category:
Definition 8.8. Given a self-similar structure (S,,) in a monoidal cate-
gory (C,⊗), we define the internal tensor of S determined by this self-similar
structure to be the monoid homomorphism
⊗ : C(S, S)× C(S, S)→ C(S, S)
given by the following generalised convolution:
S ⊗ S f⊗g // S ⊗ S


S

OO
f⊗g
// S
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We refer to [15, 16] for proof that this is a monoid homomorphism; this also
follows from the fact that f ⊗ g : S → S is, by definition, the image of f ⊗ g :
S ⊗ S → S ⊗ S under the generalised convolution functor Φ : S⊗ → C(S, S).
We now demonstrate that (C(S, S),⊗) is a one-object unitless monoidal
category.
Theorem 8.9. Given S ∈ Ob(C) as above, then there exists some τ ∈ C(S, S)
satisfying, for all f, g, h ∈ C(S, S),
1. (Naturality) τ.(f ⊗ (g ⊗ h)) = ((f ⊗ g)⊗ h).τ
2. (Pentagon condition) (τ ⊗ 1S)τ(1S ⊗ τ) = τ2
Proof. Let τ ∈ C(S, S) be defined as follows:
S
 //
τ

S ⊗ S 1S⊗ // S ⊗ (S ⊗ S)
τS,S,S

S S ⊗ S

oo (S ⊗ S)⊗ S
⊗1S
oo
Either direct calculation, or referring to [15, 16] will demonstrate that condi-
tions 1. and 2. above are satisfied. Thus (C(S, S),⊗) satisfies all the axioms
for a monoidal category, apart from the unit object. Note that in this cate-
gory, associativity can only be up to isomorphism, and is never strict; forcing
the identity τ = 1S will make C(S, S) collapse to an abelian monoid (See
Appendix B).
A simple corollary of this is the following:
Corollary 8.10. Given a self-similar structure (S,,) in a monoidal category
(C,⊗, τ ), let Φ : S⊗ → C(S, S) be the functor of Definition 8.6. Then for
all objects X,Y, Z,A,B,C ∈ Ob(S⊗),
Φ(τX,Y,Z) = Φ(τA,B,C)
i.e. Φ maps all associativity isomorphisms of S
⊗ to τ ∈ C(S, S).
Proof. This follows by the uniqueness of canonical isomorphisms in monoidal
categories.
Corollary 8.11. Let (S,,) be a dagger self-similar structure of some dagger-
monoidal category (C,⊗, ( )†). Then the one-object (unitless) monoidal category
(C(S, S),⊗) is a (unitless) dagger-monoidal category.
Proof. We have seen that the functor Φ preserves the dagger operation. now
choose arbitrary A,B,C ∈ Ob(S⊗). By Corollary 8.10 above,
τ † = Φ(τ
†
X,Y,Z) = Φ(τ
−1
A,B,C) = τ
−1

Thus τ is unitary, as required.
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As well as preserving the monoidal structure, the functor Φ preserves any
symmetric monoidal structure. We outline the proof, and refer to [15, 16] for
details.
Theorem 8.12. Let (S,,) be a self-similar structure of some symmetric
monoidal category (C,⊗, t, s). Then the functor ⊗ of Definition 8.8 above is
symmetric, up to a natural isomorphism satisfying MacLane’s hexagon condi-
tion. Further, when (S,,) is a dagger self-similar structure, then this canon-
ical isomorphism is also unitary.
Proof. We define the arrow σ ∈ C(S, S) by the following convolution:
S ⊗ S σS,S // S ⊗ S


S

OO
σ
// S
Equivalently, σ = Φ(σS,S). The functoriality of Φ implies
• (Naturality) σ(f ⊗ g) = (g ⊗ f)σ for all f, g ∈ C(S, S).
Either direct calculation or reference to [15, 16] will also demonstrate the fol-
lowing:
• (MacLane’s hexagon) τστ = (σ ⊗ 1S)τ(1S ⊗ σ).
Uniqueness of canonical isomorphisms will (in the same manner as Corollary
8.10) demonstrate that Φ(σA,B) = σ for arbitrary A,B ∈ Ob(S⊗), and
therefore, using almost identical reasoning to Corollary 8.11, when (S,,) is
a dagger self-similar structure the arrow σ ∈ C(S, S) is also unitary.
8.3 Untyped and polymorphically typed systems: a dis-
cussion
The functor Φ of Definition 8.6 may be seen to be a general type-erasing
construction; it maps various categorical structures to one-object (i.e. untyped)
analogues of the same structures. Examples include, but are certainly not lim-
ited to, symmetric monoidal structures, categorical closure (including compact
closure and Cartesian closure), categorical traces, projections and injections,
&c. [15, 16].
The immediate question must then be:
Why are we spending so much time developing a type-erasing pro-
cedure, when the whole point of the linguistics project is to -introduce-
types into models of meaning?
Recall that the starting point for our investigation of self-similarity was the
(polymorphically typed) connectives; linguistic arguments were used to demon-
strate that many of the objects corresponding to types in our models of meaning
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must be self-similar, with the self-similarity exhibited by the arrows named by
connectives. Partly, therefore, the existence of such structures is forced upon
us by the typing of connectives and their intended interpretation in some cate-
gorical model of meaning. However, there is a more fundamental justification;
so far we have simply treated the polymorphically typed connectives as arrows
parametrized by some class of objects. If we were to take a more foundational
approach and look for models based on models of (for example) System F, we
would discover a close connection between polymorphic typing and such a type-
erasing procedure.
In models of polymorphic lambda calculus and related systems, the under-
lying categories commonly have a single object; the types of the logical system
are built up from certain families of arrows, satisfying a ‘biorthogonality’ rela-
tion. Although this is far beyond the scope of this paper, we refer to [19] for an
interesting point of view, and details and references for this kind of approach.
From a linguistic point of view, we simply remark that it is perhaps not so sur-
prising that the polymorphically typed terms are exactly those that do not lose
information — inevitably and counterintuitively leading to such a type-erasing
procedure.
9 Self-similarity and lax Frobenius algebras
We have now developed the categorical machinery that enables us to justify
the claim made at the end of Section 7.6 that self-similar structures form (lax
unitless) Frobenius algebras (Definition 7.2) i.e. they satisfy the axioms of Def-
inition 7.1 (excluding those based on the unit object) up to canonical coherence
isomorphisms.
Theorem 9.1. Let (S,,) be a self-similar structure in some monoidal cate-
gory (C,⊗, τ), and let (C(S, S),⊗, τ) be the corresponding one-object unit-
less monoidal category described in Theorem 8.9. Then the following conditions
are satisfied
1. (unitless monoid) The arrow  ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) is associative, up to the
canonical associativity isomorphisms τS,S,S , τ,
2. (unitless comonoid) The arrow  ∈ C(S, S⊗S) is co-associative, up to
the canonical associativity isomorphisms τ−1S,S,S , τ,
3. (unitless Frobenius condition)The pair of arrows  ∈ C(S⊗S, S) and
 ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) satisfy the Frobenius condition of Definition 7.1, up to
the canonical associativity isomorphisms τ−1S,S,S , τ,
and hence the self-similar structure (S,,) is a (unitless, lax) Frobenius alge-
bra.
Proof. Almost by definition, the following diagrams may be seen to commute:
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1. (Lax associativity)
S
 //
τ

S ⊗ S 1S⊗ // S ⊗ (S ⊗ S)
τS,S,S

S

// S ⊗ S
⊗1S
// (S ⊗ S)⊗ S
2. (Lax co-associativity)
S ⊗ (S ⊗ S) 1S⊗ //
τS,S,S

S ⊗ S  // S
τ

(S ⊗ S)⊗ S
⊗1S
// S ⊗ S

// S
3. (Lax Frobenius condition)
S ⊗ S ⊗1S //
◦τ◦

(S ⊗ S)⊗ S
τ−1S,S,S

S ⊗ S S ⊗ (S ⊗ S)
1S⊗
oo
Corollary 9.2. Let (S,,) be a dagger self-similar structure in some dagger
monoidal category (C,⊗, τ( )†). Then the dagger self-similar structure (S,,)
is — up to the same canonical coherence isomorphisms listed above – a (unitless,
lax) dagger Frobenius algebra.
Proof. This is a simple corollary of Theorem 9.1 above, Proposition 8.7, and
Corollary 8.11.
Remark 9.3. The roˆle of coherence isomorphisms in Theorem 9.1
From a certain point of view, the proof of Theorem 9.1 seems to be cheating, in
that the diagrams used to prove associativity &c. up to isomorphism are minor
variants of those used to define the associativity isomorphism τ. In particular,
it seems highly unsurprising that associativity and co-associativity hold up to
isomorphism, since after all, the code and decode arrows are both themselves
isomorphisms. What rescues this from being a triviality is that τ is natural
and satisfies MacLane’s pentagon condition (Theorem 8.9). Therefore, in a very
strong sense, it is exactly a canonical coherence isomorphism.
Even so, the fact that two, rather than one, canonical isomorphisms are re-
quired may be considered to be pushing the definition of ‘lax’ too far – especially
since they are, technically, coherence isomorphisms for two distinct monoidal
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categories. However, these categories and monoidal tensors are not arbitrary;
instead, one is a wide subcategory of the other, and the distinct monoidal ten-
sors and coherence arrows are mutually definable by a generalised form of con-
volution. What is really required is a coherence theorem for this very special
situation!
In the absence of a full coherence theorem covering such a situation, we
are forced to rely on the familiar coherence theorems of MacLane for monoidal
categories. Ultimately, however, the acid test must be whether such structures
behave in a similar manner to more familiar Frobenius algebras. We are thus
lead into particular examples of Frobenius algebras and their applications, to
demonstrate that this is indeed the case.
10 Classical structures
A particular form of Frobenius algebra, used heavily in categorical quantum
mechanics, is the classical structure [6]. When modelling quantum phenomena
in abstract categories (e.g. as in [6, 32]) the notion of a classical structure is
fundamental in ways beyond the scope of this chapter — although fundamental
to other chapters in this volume. Instead, we consider their behaviour in a
particular concrete category.
In the symmetric dagger monoidal category (HilbFD,⊗( )†) of finite di-
mensional Hilbert spaces with tensor product and Hermitian adjoint, a classical
structure at an object H ∈ Ob(HilbFD) is exactly an orthonormal basis for
the Hilbert space H. Thus, each classical structure at on object determines
matrix representations for linear maps on this object. The connection between
orthonormal bases and measurements is clear, and the (physically reasonable)
unitary maps arise as isomorphisms of classical structures, or equivalently as
changes of basis.
Definition 10.1. A classical structure (S,∆,∇,>,⊥) in a dagger monoidal
category (C,⊗, I, ( )†) is defined to be a dagger Frobenius algebra satisfying, for
all f, g ∈ C(S, S),
1. (Commutativity) (f ⊗ g)∆ = (g ⊗ f)∆
2. (Co-Commutativity) ∇(f ⊗ g) = ∇(g ⊗ f)
3. (The Classical structure condition) ∇∆ = 1S
Note that Definition 10.1 above is somewhat over-axiomatised. In particu-
lar, as shown in [32], the classical structure condition on any Frobenius algebra
(S,∆,∇,>,⊥) in a dagger monoidal category will imply that (S,∆,∇,>,⊥)
is a dagger Frobenius algebra. Further, once the identity ∆ = ∇† is satisfied,
then commutativity and co-commutativity are equivalent. We have deliber-
ately taken this over-axiomatised route, since it is not clear how many of these
implications will survive the passage to the lax unitless version of the above
structures.
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Definition 10.2. We define a lax classical structure in a dagger monoidal
category (C,⊗, I, ( )†) to be a lax unitless dagger Frobenius algebra satisfying
conditions 1.-3. of Definition 10.1 above, up to canonical coherence isomor-
phisms.
Theorem 10.3. Let (S,,) be a dagger self-similar structure in a symmetric
dagger monoidal category (C,⊗, τ, σ), and let (C(S, S),⊗, τ, σ) be the
corresponding one-object unitless dagger symmetric monoidal category Then:
1. (S,,) is a lax unitless dagger Frobenius algebra,
2. The arrow  ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) is co-commutative, up to the canonical coher-
ence isomorphisms σS,S , σ,
3. The arrow  ∈ C(S ⊗S, S) is commutative, up to the canonical coherence
isomorphisms σS,S , σ,
4. The classical structure condition  = 1S holds, strictly.
and hence (S,,) is a lax classical structure.
Proof. As in Theorem 9.1, the following proof is almost by definition. We refer
to Remark 9.3 for a discussion of the issues around this, and Section 11 below
for justification by example of why this is reasonable.
1. We refer to Theorem 9.1 and Corollary 9.2 for a proof that (S,,) is a
lax unitless Frobenius algebra.
2. By definition of σ and naturality of canonical coherence isomorphisms,
the following diagram commutes, for all f, g ∈ C(S, S):
S
 //
σ

S ⊗ S f⊗g // S ⊗ S
S

// S ⊗ S
g⊗f
// S ⊗ S
σS,S
OO
and hence by naturality of both σS,S and σ,
(f ⊗ g) ∼= (g ⊗ f)
up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
3. Similarly to 2., since σS,S = σ
−1
S,S = σ
†
S,S , σ
−1 = σ†, and † = , the
commutativity of the above diagram for all f, g ∈ C(S, S) implies the
commutativity of the following diagram:
S ⊗ S f⊗g //
σS,S

S ⊗ S  // S
S ⊗ S
g⊗f
// S ⊗ S

// S
σ
OO
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and thus  ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) is commutative up to canonical coherence iso-
morphisms.
4. The defining equation of a self-similar structure is:
 = 1S ,  = 1S⊗S
– a stronger (i.e. two-sided) version of the classical structure condition.
It may be objected again (as in Remark 9.3) that using canonical isomor-
phisms from two distinct settings is pushing the definition of a lax structure too
far. In the absence of a full coherence theorem relating the monoidal tensor of
a category (& its canonical isomorphisms) with the internal tensor at an object
(& its canonical isomorphisms), this is worth considering.
However, we now present an intriguing example where distinct self-similar
structures at some object S within a symmetric monoidal category determine
distinct matrix representations for arrows on this object.
11 A self-similar structure familiar in logic (and
linguistics)
One of the best-studied self-similar structures, at least in certain logical com-
munities, is the dynamical algebra. There are many wide-ranging applications,
including the pure untyped lambda calculus [9], linear logic and the Geometry
of interaction [12], combinatory logic [3].
In [9], the dynamical algebra is introduced as the monoid semiring P [N],
where the monoid P may be defined in terms of generators and relations, as
follows:
P = 〈p, q, p′, q′ : pp′ = 1 = qq′ , pq′ = 0 = qp′〉
(This is of course, the inverse polycyclic monoid of [31]).
Other definitions vary in the precise notion of summation used, often re-
stricting or generalising the summation via reference to some representation
(e.g. analytic convergence in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [12], suprema
in the natural partial order of an inverse category [15], the Σ-monoid axioma-
tisation of [13, 3], &c.) However, in every case, the representations given are
self-similar structures in a monoidal category (a purely categorical explanation
of how the polycyclic monoid arises from self-similarity is given in [16]).
A particularly well-studied example is the monoidal category of partial iso-
morphisms on sets, with disjoint union (pInj,unionmulti). Here, any bijection N ∼= NunionmultiN
gives rise to an embedding of the dynamical algebra in pInj(N,N) [15, 16].
The key feature at this point is that — even though it does not have a co-
product — the monoidal category (pInj,unionmulti) admits matrix representations, as
observed by many authors [15, 27, 3]. Thus, any isomorphism N ∼= NunionmultiN allows
us to give (2 × 2) matrix representations to partial bijections on N. However,
31
matrix representations for these arrows are not unique; instead, each matrix rep-
resentation uniquely determines, and is determined by, such an isomorphism.
The details of how these dagger self-similar structures act like bases for such
matrix representations, allowing for many properties more familiar from linear
algebra such as matrix representations, changes of basis, diagonalisations, mu-
tual diagonalisation, &c. are the subject of a forthcoming paper.
Finally, for readers who fear that we have by now strayed way too far from any
possible linguistic interpretation, we refer to the recent rediscovery of structures
isomorphic to the dynamical algebra in linguistic models of meaning [4, 5].
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A Order-preserving bijections N ∼= N unionmulti N as in-
terior points of the Cantor set
We now give an explicit illustration of how the points of the Cantor set (ex-
cluding a distinguished subset of measure zero) may be interpreted as order-
preserving bijections exhibiting the self-similarity of the natural numbers (with
respect to disjoint union; however, a very similar construction applies to the
natural numbers with Cartesian product – this is left as an exercise).
Definition A.1. The Cantor set is defined to be the set of all one-sided infi-
nite binary strings, C = {0, 1}ω or equivalently, the set Fun(N, {0, 1}) of all
functions from N to {0, 1}. A point a = a0a1a2a3 . . . of the Cantor set is called
a boundary point if there exists some K ∈ N such that, for all L ≥ K,
aL = aK . We denote the set of all boundary points by CB. The complement of
the boundary is called the interior, denoted CO = C \ CB. Members of CO are
called interior points or balanced functions. Note that the set of boundary
points is a countable subset of C , whereas its complement, the set of interior
points, has the same cardinality as the Cantor set itself
Theorem A.2. Each interior point of the Cantor set η ∈ CO uniquely deter-
mines and is determined by an order-preserving bijection η˜ : N→ N unionmulti N.
Proof. By construction, the balanced function η : N→ {0, 1} divides N into two
disjoint countably infinite subsets N = η−1(0)∪η−1(1). Each of these subsets is
totally ordered, with order inherited from N in the obvious way, so N is divided
into two disjoint countably infinite chains. This is illustrated by example in
figure 4.
Each interior point η : N → {0, 1} uniquely determines and is determined
by such a split into disjoint chains; η is simply the indicator function for chain
membership. As both chains are countably infinite, this therefore determines
a bijection η˜ : N → N unionmulti N in the obvious way. Formally, taking N unionmulti N def.=
N× {0} ∪ N× {1}, we have
η˜(n) = (x, η(n)) where x =

n−∑j<n η(j) η(n) = 0∑
j<n η(j) η(n) = 1
This is again illustrated in Figure 4.
By construction, η˜ : N → N unionmulti N is order-preserving, and since η is simply
the indicator function for the division of N into two disjoint countably infinite
chains, all such bijections arise in this way. Finally, it is immediate that
η˜ = µ˜⇔ η = µ
and so (˜ ) is bijective.
The following special case is then immediate:
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Figure 4: A balanced indicator function, two chains and a bijection
n = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 · · ·
p(n) = 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 · · ·
p−1(0) : 0 1 4 6 8 9 · · ·
p−1(1) : 2 3 5 7 · · ·
p˜(n) = (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 0) (2, 1) (3, 0) (3, 1) (4, 0) (5, 0) · · ·
Corollary A.3. Under the correspondence of Theorem A.2, the familiar Cantor
pairing
n 7→

(
n
2 , 0
)
n even(
n−1
2 , 1
)
n odd
corresponds to the alternating point 0101010101 . . . of the Cantor set, or equiv-
alently the function n 7→ n (mod 2).
Although the above example is simple, we emphasise that Theorem A.2 is
about all interior points of the Cantor set, not simply the computable ones. For
example, we could consider an enumeration of Turing machines T0,T1,T2,T3, . . .
and define the interior point u ∈ CO by u(n) = 0 if Tn halts, and u(n) = 1
otherwise. By Theorem A.2, this also corresponds to an (uncomputable) order-
preserving bijection N→ N unionmulti N.
It is entirely possible that, should we restrict ourselves to computable interior
points of the Cantor set, we would be able to develop a consistent theory of
computable self-similar structures. However, this is work that remains to be
carried out.
B Isbell’s argument in a general setting
In [30], MacLane introduces associativity up to isomorphism, by reference to
a result of J. Isbell, on denumerable objects in the category (Fun,×) of sets
and functions with Cartesian product. Isbell demonstrated that, for any object
D ∈ Ob(Fun), the existence of a bijection between D and D×D would, in the
presence of strict associativity, force all endomorphism arrows of D to be iden-
tified (i.e. D would necessarily be isomorphic to the unit object of (Fun,×)).
This gave a very strong argument for the necessity of considering associativ-
ity up to isomorphism, rather than strict associativity; requiring strict associa-
tivity forces an identification of the natural numbers N with the one-object set
{∗}, in the category (Fun,×). A slight variation of Isbell’s argument, in more
modern language, demonstrates that this is not unique to the Cartesian closed
category Fun.
Let S be a self-similar object of some symmetric monoidal category (C,⊗),
and let the subcategory S⊗ be the full subcategory of S given in Definition 8.4.
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It is stated in this definition that S⊗ is a unitless monoidal category. This is
correct; however, it is worth considering the objects of S⊗ to see why none of
these act as the unit object for S⊗. In particular, for every object X ∈ Ob(S⊗),
it is a simple corollary of Proposition 8.5 that
X ⊗ S ∼= X ∼= S ⊗X
The natural question then, is: why is S ∈ Ob(S⊗) not the unit object? The
simple answer is that, although X ⊗ S ∼= X ∼= S ⊗ X, the arrows exhibiting
these isomorphisms do not satisfy the coherence conditions given in [30] — in
particular, their interaction with the other canonical isomorphisms fails.
However, when we ignore canonical isomorphisms and coherence conditions
this is no longer an obstacle, and we are forced to conclude that the category
(S⊗,⊗) does indeed have a unit object; S itself – with all this implies about the
endomorphism monoid of S (see Proposition 3.7).
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